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1. Crisis management in the European
Union: an introduction1
The ECB is doing crisis prevention in many ways, in par-
ticularly through promoting co-ordination and co-oper-
ation between national supervisors, mainly through the
ESCB Banking Supervision Committee, and providing
liquidity management on the inter-bank markets. The
ECB has reduced the rate for its main refinancing oper-
ations within the past month from 4.25% to 3.25%. A
non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on
Cross-Border Financial Stability was also signed last
summer between the Financial Supervision Authorities,
Central Banks and the Finance Ministries of the
European Union. Stress test and crises management
simulations have also taken place. This MoU is designed
to facilitate the management and resolution of cross-
border systemic financial crises and will seek to facilitate
private sector solutions, to minimise the economic and
social costs, while promoting market discipline and lim-
iting moral hazard. Those parties that have specific
common financial stability concerns are encouraged to
develop Voluntary Specific Cooperation Agreements
with a view to provide for more specific and detailed,
procedures and arrangements of crisis management and
resolution for their respective countries and in relevant
contexts. However, in practice it looks like Member
States have taken very different approaches in face of
banking problems and crisis management, for example
in the Benelux countries, in Ireland, in Germany, in
Denmark and in the UK to mention some. Even if in
most cases the direct effects have been national, major
spillover effects may arise both for foreign banks oper-
ating in the region and/or policy measures to be taken
in another Member State. In a statistic prepared for the
ECON Committee of the EP, financial institutions were
ranked according to their size and diversification of
ownership among EU Member States in order to do a
'pre-selection' of financial institutions potentially vul-
nerable to systemic risk and important for cross-border
stability in the EU.
Section 2 will describe the development of the crisis
with the denial phase, the discovery phase and disposal
phase of the crisis. Then we analyse in Section 3 the
nationalisation of banks and the three conditions that
need to be fulfilled to make a bailout as unattractive as
possible. In Section 4 four important lessons for the
credit crisis are drawn for the future. Finally, in Section
5 the benchmarks for the new financial system are
analysed: sustainability, integrity and transparency.
2.The development of the crisis: the
denial, discovery and disposal phase
This credit crisis, as we all know, has its roots in the sub-
prime crisis of summer 2007. However, at that point it
was not acknowledged that this subprime crisis could
grow out to be a larger crisis; even more so, this was
denied. The development of the crisis is quite aptly put
in The Economist of April 3rd 2008: ‘First there was dis-
belief and denial. Then fear. Now comes anger.’ The
anger is of course caused by the failure of financial
supervision, which will become clear in a later part of
this paper.
The denial phase is exemplified by several points,
especially by Chairman Bernanke of the Federal Reserve,
who said that ‘the Fed does not see the tightening of
credit conditions in the market as severe enough to have
macro-economic implications.’2 He did note that the
subprime crisis was not completely played out yet, so
conditions could still worsen. However, the Fed also
noted that the Bear Stearns case was reassuring as its
losses could be absorbed by the financial system with-
out much adverse effects for credit supply; the Fed did
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Even in 2008, just before the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, its CEO Richard Fuld seemed to deny that
there was something wrong. He blamed short sellers for
the ‘symptoms of a sickness rooted in denial’, just to
shield himself from the ‘pain of reality’3 that was immi-
nent. In October 2008 some finance directors of non-
financial companies still denied that there was a liquid-
ity problem, even if interbank rates had shot up through
the roof4 (see also the graph on Euribor rates below).
Then, during the course of 2008, the discovery phase
started. Banks started to write off bad loans and secu-
ritisation products, a process that also uncovered many
hidden linkages among financial institutions. Asset
holdings by banks and other financial institutions had
been very opaque, hiding the linkages to (among oth-
ers) subprime mortgages in the United States. Because
of the losses on their loans and other assets, many
banks were in serious trouble. In the end contagion of
the subprime crisis became reality when several banks
started to collapse, the most notable example being
Lehman Brothers5. Because of the lack of confidence in
the markets, marginal costs of capital and interbank
lending rose tremendously as risk premiums went up
(see also the graphs below). A good illustration is also
the fact that banks in the euro area deposited record
amounts of euros at the ECB, i.e. they did not want to
lend that money to others, a clear sign of lack of con-
fidence. In the first graph, the value of existing equity
capital has declined greatly and thus the costs to attract
new capital have risen. In the second graph, we see that
the risk premia for interbank lending have risen during
the course of the crisis. Therefore, banks could not
attract enough buffer capital or renew their short term
financing.
This led to the disposal phase of the crisis: national
governments stepped in to rescue banks that were
important for the financial system, to prevent a systemic
crisis from happening. These actions were aimed at
restoring the confidence and thus liquidity in the mar-
kets. As we can see below, the costs of capital (a meas-
ure for solvency) and interbank money market rates (a
measure for liquidity) have indeed surged but declined
during the last half of 2008 by the emergency measures
by governments and central banks. This can be best
seen in the development of the three-month Euribor
interbank interest rate.
3. Bailouts and nationalisation of banks:
three conditions that need to be 
fulfilled
Several banks and insurers in Europe have been nation-
alised or bailed-out, i.e. assisted with emergency (tier 1)
core capital. Examples of this include the government
takeover of ABN AMRO and Fortis in the Netherlands,
the emergency assistance to ING, AEGON and SNS
Reaal, the bailout of Dexia in Belgium and the bailout
of UBS in Switzerland.
Bailouts or nationalisations by the government need
to satisfy three criteria. First, the nationalisation needs
to be temporary to keep intact the level playing field on
the financial markets. This holds for both banks and
insurers. Second, the government and thus the taxpay-
ers need to face an upward risk, which arises when the
bank is privatised after the nationalisation period.
Although it is not the intention for the government and
taxpayers to make a profit of the bailout or nationalisa-
tion, they are entitled to this upward risk because they
are providing risk-bearing (tier 1) core capital.
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Note: this graph represents the total return on the MSCI World Market
index, which can be used as a proxy for the cost of capital. We can
see that the marginal cost of capital has increased tremendously, as
the value of equity capital has declined during the last half of 2008.
Note: this graph represents the three-month Euribor interbank inter-
est rate. We have zoomed in to better show the increase during 2008,
followed by a spike in September and a decline after government
injections.
3 Financial Times, ‘Denial disguises reality of Lehman crisis’,
September 14, 2008
4 Financial Times, ‘Finance directors should plan early’, October 28,
2008
5 The Economist, ‘Cross-border contagion’, September 18, 2008
Additionally, the government should profit from the
transaction in the form of high interest rates that finan-
cial institutions have to pay for the emergency assis-
tance. Third, there should be a downward risk for the
financial institution involved and its executives and
shareholders. They have caused the problems that the
bank or insurer is faced with, so they also have felt the
pain by respectively giving up bonuses and options and
lower stock prices.
These three conditions need to be fulfilled to make a
bailout as unattractive as possible by making the costs
as high as possible, so that the management of the
institution has an incentive to revert to the normal
course of business as soon as possible. Since public
money is involved, the government should be account-
able both at the national level and the EU level to make
sure that these conditions are fulfilled and to avoid
competition in conditions between the EU countries.6
This should also hold ex ante: the circumstances in
which this assistance takes place are very rare, and the
conditions will be very painful.7
4. Four important lessons from the
credit crisis
This credit crisis has provided us with four important
lessons: (1) the top management reward and remunera-
tion structure has been excessive, (2) the risk manage-
ment models based on Basel II have proven to be inad-
equate, (3) the financial supervisors in the US and
Europe have not been involved thoroughly enough and
(4) the US framework of financial supervision has
proven to be too much fragmented and totally ineffec-
tive.
First, top executives reward and remuneration pack-
ages have been asymmetric in the sense that there is no
downward risk or limited liability for top managers. The
reward structure should be more aimed at the long
term, and both the upward and downward risks should
be symmetric and stretch beyond their term in office.
These executives have chosen an Anglo-Saxon reward
structure. This means that they cannot have Rheinland
protection as well. Managers should take their responsi-
bilities when things take a turn for the worse. We can
think of negative bonuses and conditional options (in
case of large risks that only manifest after the manag-
er's term in office is over), or the manager may resign
when staying in office is no longer credible. The com-
pensation structure should hold ‘In good times and in
bad times’. This also means that the Boards of Directors
(Trustees) should no longer only consist of top man-
agers, but also of independent experts who hold them-
selves far enough from the Executive Board. This may
lead to difficult discussions in the short term for exec-
utives, but it creates broader support for a financial
institution's long-term strategy.
Secondly, the risk management models based on Basel
II have not passed the stress test of the credit crisis. This
was to be expected, as ex post risk (certainly in times of
crisis) is not a good proxy for ex ante uncertainty.
Furthermore, during this the fat tails and the skewness
of the return distribution have proven to be more
important than the mean and the variance.8 The devil
was in the tail! Hopefully this failure of the financial
econometricians and risk managers in mapping the
uncertainties results in a revaluation for the intuition of
'old-fashioned' bankers, insurers and financial econo-
mists. We should acknowledge that monitoring the
return distributions give a false and incomplete picture
of the fundamental uncertainty in an environment of
innovation and long-term risks. 
The Basel Committee itself has already indicated,
through its Chairman Nout Wellink, that a thorough
revision of the risk management and capital adequacy
regulations is needed9. The Basel committee already
proposed raising capital requirements for complex
structured credit products, liquidity facilities to support
asset-backed commercial paper conduits and credit
exposures held due to trading. Additionally, the com-
mittee said that standards for liquidity management
needed to be strengthened. Another problem is the pro-
cyclicality of the capital requirements, which has to be
addressed by the Basel Committee. It is evident that the
capital requirements should become more anti-cyclical.
Several researchers have additionally proposed
improvements for risk management and capital plan-
ning to make banks more resilient to crises. Alexander
and Sheedy (2008), among others, propose a new
method for stress testing to incorporate heavy tails and
thus to take into account extreme events, something
which the current methods did not do. Their method
also incorporates abnormal market characteristics dur-
ing crises, such as an increased probability of further
large movements (besides the initial crisis), increased
correlation between markets, a greater implied volatility
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6 Recently, AEGON also applied for $1 billion from the US Troubled
Asset Relief Program because the more favourable conditions com-
pared with the Dutch bailout. This is bailout arbitrage or compe-
tition.
7 Fellgett, Robin (2003), Comments on Freixas, Xavier (2003), "Crisis
Management in Europe", Chapter 4 in J. Kremers, D. Schoenmaker
and P. Wierts (Eds.), Financial Supervision in Europe, Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham.
8 De Grauwe, Paul (2008), ‘Return to narrow banking’, in What G20
leaders must do to stabilise the economy and fix the financial sys-
tem, Barry Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin (Eds.), VoxEU.org,
CEPR
9 Business Insurance, ‘Subprime crisis triggers effort to strengthen
banking system’, June 9, 2008.
(2008) additionally proposes a restriction on the lever-
age ratio of banks to induce truthful reporting of risks.
This makes it also easier for supervisors to sanction dis-
honest banks.
These measures should make banks more prepared for
crises with the scale and nature of this one by creating
strong capital cushions, robust liquidity buffers, strong
risk management and supervision and better market dis-
cipline.
Thirdly, it has become clear that national central
banks and financial supervisors have to be much more
involved with risk management in financial institutions.
We have seen that CEOs do not understand the risk
management models and aim for higher yields and the
risks connected to those yields. Regulators have to pro-
vide incentives for banks to take into account risks bet-
ter when searching for higher yields . This does not nec-
essarily have to come from more strict supervision.
Because of their strategic interaction with financial
institutions, supervisors should use modern game-theo-
retic concepts like constructive ambiguity and incentive
compatibility to realise smarter and more efficient
supervision.
However, clear-cut rules also need to be set.
Following Freixas (2003), we can set some conditions
for (cross-border) financial supervision. It has to be
made clear to banks that the probability of a bailout is
lower than they currently expect. As a consequence,
banks face tighter capital regulation, and more collater-
al has to be held in transactions. This guards the system
against contagion of bank failures. Additionally, the dis-
cipline on honesty in disclosure of risk in loans should
be tougher, as it already is in New Zealand.
Moreover, some ambiguity about bailouts may be
necessary, but not too much: it should become clear to
financial institutions under what conditions they can
get emergency funding and what the availability of this
funding will be (Fellgett, 2003). When this is clear, gov-
ernments should not teem too long with regulatory for-
bearance and (unconstructive) liquidity support in the
hope insolvent institutions will recover10. This only
increases the strain on the system and increases the
probability of a crisis. However, policymakers should
also take into account the trade-off between helping
banks at the taxpayer's expense, creating moral hazard,
and rescuing the financial system.
It is also important to note that these methods of reg-
ulation may alleviate the problem that bankers and
traders are always one step ahead of regulators. By cre-
ating the proper incentives, activist regulation may not
be as necessary anymore and liberalisation can do its
much needed work11.
Finally, the credit crisis has showed us that the
American system of financial supervision has failed and
that the European supervision of banks and insurers
also needs significant improvement. The economists of
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) blame lax
monetary policy mainly in the US and the supervisory
practices of the Federal Reserve12. US policymakers have
learned their tough and expensive lessons, and will have
to streamline their supervisory practices drastically. This
will certainly involve a larger role for the Federal Reserve
as supervisor and/or the creation of a new overall super-
visor.
European politicians will have to agree on a European
federal supervisor, either a European Financial Services
Authority (EFSA) or a European System of Financial
Supervisors (ESFS). This European supervisor has to
serve as an umbrella organisation for the national cen-
tral banks and supervisors and should be responsible for
the complete financial supervision in the European
Union, mainly dealing with the cross-border effects of
individual supervisor's actions (see: my Briefing Paper of
June 2007 and Schoenmaker and Oosterloo, 2007). It
should be independent from the ECB to guarantee
monetary stability, but the two bodies must cooperate
and inform each other. National supervisors remain to
exist, as they have insights in local financial institutions
and markets. For cross-border banking and finance,
however, uniform EU-wide rules should be adhered to.
While the reform of US supervision will imply a larger
role for the Federal Reserve, the Maastricht Treaty does
not provide for the ECB to have a responsibility for pru-
dential supervision in Europe. The ECB is only responsi-
ble for financial stability in the EU.
Before this can be realised, it is not a good idea to set
up a European emergency fund. Without uniform
supervision, such a fund can provide the wrong incen-
tives (moral hazard), and induce free-riding behaviour
and regulatory competition between member states
that may lead to a 'race to the bottom' (Garcia and
Nieto, 2007). Moral hazard is caused by the asymmetric
risk that bankers have in joining the fund: they can take
new risks without having to worry about adverse devel-
opments, since government pays for cleaning up the
mess that may occur. The free-riding behaviour stems
from some countries having more strict regulation than
others. Countries with weak banking systems and regu-
lation profit from countries with strong banking sys-
tems, as the former are more prone to financial crises.
Additionally, countries that do not sign up for the fund
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11 The Economist, ‘Link by link: a short history of modern finance’,
October 18, 2008. 12 The Economist, ‘A monetary malaise’, October 11, 2008.
profit from it anyway, as financial stability is a public
good. This also leads to regulatory competition between
member states, to lure big banks and financial institu-
tions to their country. Goodhart and Schoenmaker
(2008) come up with a mechanism for the European
Union to be able to coordinate crisis management.
Member states have to agree ex ante on a specific bur-
den sharing mechanism. In this system, member states
contribute to the fund according to the geographical
spread of bank business. This guarantees long-term
coordination better than ex post, improvised coordina-
tion.
We see that we cannot yet set up a European emer-
gency fund without having European-wide supervision
and policy coordination in guarding financial stability.
A complete European safety net and regulation mecha-
nism that goes beyond the current Memoranda of
Understanding must be guided by the principles of con-
structive ambiguity and incentive compatibility (Freixas,
2003). Supervisors have to be able to agree ex ante
upon the payments they make to the safety net, as to
alleviate the problems with improvised cooperation that
stem from its public good nature. Such a coordination
mechanism also allows for more efficient information
collection by national supervisors, better information
provision to the central supervisory authority and lower
social costs for using public money to rescue banks.
Europe has also needed a crisis to make a leap forward.
If this credit crisis is the 'wake-up call' for Europe, then
it has had its use after all. A quote by Freixas and Parigi
(2008) sketches how the new supervisory practice
should look like: 
‘…the issue is less to understand what rules the
LOLR [Lender of Last Resort] should follow but
what architecture of prudential regulation, risk
supervision, monetary policy, deposit insurance and
ELA is best to guarantee financial stability by pro-
viding liquidity to banks.’
5. Benchmarks for a new financial 
system: sustainability, integrity and
transparency
As an analogy to a country after a major war, we can
state that the bigger the financial crisis, the bigger the
reorganisation. This holds for the whole financial sys-
tem, and especially for big financial institutions that
have always been deemed 'too big to fail'. As Joseph
Stiglitz puts it: ‘[While they] may be too big to fail,
they're not too big to be reorganised’13. The benchmarks
for the new financial system that will emerge must be:
(1) sustainability, (2) integrity and (3) transparency.
Sustainability consists of a long-term view on the
architecture of the financial system. This includes the
trade-off that banks face, between holding collateral
and increasing the risk of systemic crisis (Freixas 2003).
This can be obtained by giving the proper incentives to
banks, among others by agreeing on European-wide
regulation and coordination of crisis management.
Executive compensation structures, for instance, have to
be revised to give managers a long-term view and avoid
excessive risk-taking without incurring any losses.
Integrity deals with incomplete information about
complicated investment products, both for consumers
and for corporate investors. An example of this is the
Lehman notes, despite the high leveraging considered
by consumers as 'safe bonds', and the 'Woekerpolis-
affaire' in the Netherlands, indicating the problems
around investment insurance products for consumers.
These have led to media attention and even law suits. A
similar issue played in 2001, when consumers that had
leased stocks (i.e. bought them with borrowed money)
incurred a huge amount of interest. These problems are
examples dealing with financial institutions that provide
too little information about complicated products.
Additionally, rating agencies need stricter regulation to
be able to properly assess the risk of (complicated)
financial products14. This can for instance be achieved
by making the regulator select the appropriate agency
to rate a certain issuer. Rating agencies also have to
provide more information about the models they use to
rate several types of products, including complicated
securitisation products15. Together with standardised
reporting and originator principles in the US and Europe
this has to restore the confidence in derivative markets.
Transparency, which is the cornerstone of any system
that relies on confidence. As Freixas and Parigi (2008)
have put it, the lack of transparency is what has lead to
significant adverse selection in the interbank market
and prohibitively high interest rates. An intervention by
government can only be a partial substitute for well-
functioning interbank markets. Therefore, transparency
of complicated products should increase so that appro-
priate risk premia can be assigned. Regulators have
already identified transparency and standardisation as
two key areas to improve upon in 200716, but the cri-
sis has prompted them even more to do this. However,
risk distribution should not be wiped out completely, as
it is important to protect the banking system and finan-
cial stability, given that it is transparent enough.
Additionally, note that financial regulators and supervi-
sors cannot foresee and counteract every step that the
market takes. As stated in The Economist (April 3,
2008): ‘The experience of the past year is an object les-
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13 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Reversal of Fortune, November 1, 2008,
http://www.truthout.org/103108R.
14 Buiter, Willem H. (2008), ‘Some suggestions for the G20 on
November 15th’, in What G20 leaders must do to stabilise the
economy and fix the financial system, Barry Eichengreen and
Richard Baldwin (Eds.), VoxEU.org, CEPR.
15 Kiff, John, Paul Mills and Carolyne Spackman, ‘European securiti-
sation and the possible revival of financial innovation,’ October 28,
2008, VoxEU.org, CEPR.
16 Financial Times, ‘Watchdogs look for more transparency on secu-
ritisations’, October 10, 2007.
neering and innovation has a price, which is that finan-
cial crises do occur every now and then. Regulators and
supervisors have to let markets develop in order to
achieve economic growth. They should learn the lessons
of the past crises, but they can never prevent the next
financial crisis, which will show itself in a different
shape.
References
Alexander, Carol, Elizabeth Sheedy (2008), Developing a
stress testing framework based on market risk models,
Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (10), pp. 2220-
2236.
Buiter, Willem H. (2008), ‘Some suggestions for the G20
on November 15th’, in What G20 leaders must do to
stabilise the economy and fix the financial system,
Barry Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin (Eds.),
VoxEU.org.
Blum, Jurg M. (2008), Why `Basel II' may need a lever-
age ratio restriction, Journal of Banking & Finance 32
(8), pp. 1699-1707.
De Grauwe, Paul (2008), ‘Return to narrow banking’, in
What G20 leaders must do to stabilise the economy
and fix the financial system, Barry Eichengreen and
Richard Baldwin (Eds.), VoxEU.org.
The Economist, ‘Cross-border contagion’, September
18, 2008
The Economist, ‘A monetary malaise’, October 11, 2008
The Economist, ‘Link by link: a short history of modern
finance’, October 18, 2008
Fellgett, Robin (2003), Comments on Freixas, Xavier
(2003), ‘Crisis Management in Europe’, Chapter 4 in J.
Kremers, D. Schoenmaker and P. Wierts (Eds.),
Financial Supervision in Europe, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham.
Financial Times, ‘Bernanke sees little threat of credit
crunch’, July 19, 2007
Financial Times, ‘Watchdogs look for more transparen-
cy on securitisations’, October 10, 2007.
Financial Times, ‘Denial disguises reality of Lehman cri-
sis’, September 14, 2008
Financial Times, ‘Finance directors should plan early’,
October 28, 2008
Freixas, Xavier (2003), ‘Crisis Management in Europe’,
Chapter 4 in J. Kremers, D. Schoenmaker and P.
Wierts (Eds.), Financial Supervision in Europe, Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham
Freixas, Xavier and Parigi, Bruno Maria (2008), ‘Lender
of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy’, CESifo
Working Paper Series No. 2286.
Garcia, Gillian G. H. & Maria J. Nieto (2007), ‘Preserving
Financial Stability: A Dilemma For The European
Union’, Contemporary Economic Policy 25(3), pp.
444-458, Western Economic Association
International.
Goodhart, Charles A.E. and Schoenmaker, Dirk (2008),
‘Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises.
Internationa’, Journal of Central Banking,
Forthcoming.
Kiff, John, Paul Mills and Carolyne Spackman,
‘European securitisation and the possible revival of
financial innovation’, 28 October 2008, VoxEU.org. 
Laeven, Luc, ‘The cost of resolving a financial crisis’,
October 31, 2008, VoxEU.org.
Schoenmaker, Dirk and Sander Oosterloo (2007), ‘Cross-
border Issues in European Financial Supervision’, in:
David Mayes and Geoffrey Wood (eds), The Structure
of Financial Regulation, Routledge, London, 264-291.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., ‘Reversal of Fortune’, 1 November
2008, http://www.truthout.org/103108R.



















The Centre for Economic Policy Research , founded in 1983, is a network of over 700 researchers based main-
ly in universities throughout Europe, who collaborate through the Centre in research and its dissemination. The
Centre’s goal is to promote research excellence and policy relevance in European economics. CEPR Research
Fellows and Affiliates are based in over 237 different institutions in 28 countries. Because it draws on such a large
network of researchers, CEPR is able to produce a wide range of research which not only addresses key policy
issues, but also reflects a broad spectrum of individual viewpoints and perspectives. CEPR has made key contribu-
tions to a wide range of European and global policy issues for over two decades. CEPR research may include views
on policy, but the Executive Committee of the Centre does not give prior review to its publications, and the Centre
takes no institutional policy positions.The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and not neces-
sarily those of the Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Sylvester Eijffinger is Professor of Financial Economics at Tilburg University and Board Member of the European
Banking Center in Tilburg, as well as Visiting Professor of Economics at Harvard University in Cambridge, MA during
the Spring semester of 2008.He held, amongst others, Visiting Professorships at University of Johannesburg,
Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, and the University of Munich. Professor Eijffinger has a keen interest in monetary
and fiscal policy and European economic and financial integration, and was Visiting Scholar at the Deutsche
Bundesbank, the Bank of Japan, the Banque de France, the Bank of England, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as well as Special Advisor to the International Monetary
Fund and the European Commission.
Professor Eijffinger has published widely in prestigious economics journals and is editor of several professional jour-
nals and newsletters, as well as Programme Director of the European Summer Institute of the Centre for Economic
Policy Research, London. He is one of the founding fathers of the newly established European Banking Center in
Tilburg. Sylvester Eijffinger was during three years a member of the Council of Economic Advisers of the Dutch
Parliament and is still a member of the Monetary Experts Panel of the European Parliament for the Monetary
Dialogue with the ECB.
